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1. Introduction
There is potential for corporate crime in a market 
economy as long as calculated benefit exceeds pro-
spective punitive consequence. Therefore, while 
enjoying economic prosperity brought by a rapid turn 
from a planned economy to a market one since the 
opening-up and reform policy in the beginning of the 
1980s, China has also been confronted with a surpris-
ing increase in corporate crime. Skyrocketing 
corporate crime and strong belief in the deterrent 
effect of criminal penalty enabled China to move from 
criticizing corporate criminality to establishing corpo-
rate punishment in less than 10 years. Since the 
promulgation of Customs Law of the People’s Repub-
lic of China enacted on Jan.22th 1987, the first law 
establishing corporate punishment, the Standing Com-
mittee of National People’s Congress of China 
(hereafter, NPC) had adopted more than 10 separate 
criminal laws providing corporate punishment before 
1997, when China thoroughly and comprehensively 
revised its first criminal code enacted in 1979. Amend-
ment to Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of 
China enacted in 1997 (hereafter, 97 Criminal Law) is 
a milestone in the history of corporate punishment in 
China in that it defines corporate crime and persons 
supposed to bear culpability in General Part and lists 
specific corporate crimes article by article in Specific 
Part?.
It has been 20 years since the establishment of 
corporate punishment in China, and now might be the 
time to rethink it as the current situation of corporate 
crime disclosed by both public media and official 
reports implies that it has not been functioning as 
effectively as legislators anticipated, despite the fact 
that judicial authorities have devoted themselves to 
prosecuting and punishing culpable corporations. 
What is prohibiting legislature’s objective from being 
realized and what else should be done in order to 
check the current of corporate crime in China? In an 
effort to answer this question, this article first reviews 
the history of corporate punishment in China by quot-
ing both academic studies and legislative documents. 
Then, it introduces in detail corporate crimes and pun-
ishments according to current criminal laws and 
judicial interpretations. Furthermore, it reviews the 
practice of corporate punishment and its effectiveness 
on basis of official statistics and public reports and 
suggests that the failure of corporate punishment be 
analyzed at two levels, namely, enforcement of crimi-
nal law and design of corporate punishment. Finally, 
based on statistics, academic studies and specific 
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cases, it discusses principles that might benefit future 
reform of corporate punishment from a general per-
spective.
2.  History of Corporate Punishment in 
China
Corporate criminality and punishment were 
excluded from laws and academic works throughout 
the 1950s to 1970s in China because both legislators 
and scholars were convinced that “a Legal person is a 
kind of organization recognized by the State and met 
requirements of society, therefore, it can’t commit 
crime in its own right. Moreover, a legal person must 
act through its representatives. The representatives are 
supposed to act within charters or constitution of the 
legal person, and beyond the limit their acts should not 
be recognized as those of the legal person and there-
fore they themselves must take responsibility. 
Furthermore, the opinion that a legal person can 
become a criminal actor goes against purposes of pun-
ishment of punishing, educating and rehabilitating 
criminals and preventing crimes because a legal per-
son gets no criminal mind to be educated and thus 
couldn’t be rehabilitated. Consequently, when a fac-
tory intentionally manufactured and sold products of 
inferior quality or not in accordance with standards 
stipulated by laws, it is the executive or technological 
personnel in charge not the factory that should be held 
liable?.”
China’s resistance to corporate punishment was 
deeply rooted in economic structure and criminal the-
ory with a strong tradition of Continental law at the 
time. On one hand, a planned system had been domi-
nating economic activities since the socialist 
transformation in the beginning of the 1950s, thus 
units lacked motivation to commit illegality, in other 
words, desire to maximize profits in China. On the 
other hand, theories on crime definition and constitu-
tion of a crime advocated by legal scholars of the 
former Soviet Union, which were thought to have a 
strong relationship with criminal theories in Ger-
many?, were transplanted into China without major 
changes by Chinese scholars in the 1950s and 1960s?. 
Considering that the standpoint against the inclusion 
of corporate criminal liability still speaks louder in 
German academic circle, even nowadays, due to belief 
in the fundamental principle of Roman law that a legal 
person cannot commit a crime?, it was understandable 
that Chinese scholars and legislators refused to recog-
nize corporate criminality.
Therefore, it was not until the early 1980s, when 
market mechanism began to take the place of various 
plans of administrative organs at different levels 
directing activities of business entities in China, did 
corporate punishment attract political and academic 
attention and begin its own history. According to sym-
bolic criminal legislative documents, the history of 
corporate punishment in China may be divided into 3 
periods: argument period: 1979-1987, establishment 
period: 1987-1997 and development period: after 
1997.
Ⅰ　Argument Period: 1979-1987
One of the key factors in the opening and reform 
policy in the 1980s in China is a swift shift from a 
planned economy system to a market one, which led 
not only to fundamental changes in ownership, posi-
t ive market activit ies and greater economic 
enthusiasm, but also to increase of illegality by legal 
persons now capable of gaining their own benefits, e.g. 
it was reported that more than 100 enterprises and 
institutions in Tianjing (37.5% of the total number) 
were involved in speculation and profiteering in 1981, 
six times as much as in 1980?. Stimulated by the 
urgency to control the activities of legal persons, 
inspired by the practice of punishing criminal corpora-
tions abroad and believing criminal punishment to be 
the most effective tool, Chinese scholars for the first 
time challenged traditional criminal theories based on 
criminal liability of a natural person dominating both 
academic and legislature circles, by proposing corpo-
rate punishment.
ⅰ　Arguments for Corporate Punishment
Arguments for Corporate Punishment were struc-
tured from perspectives of the nature of a legal person, 
constitution of a crime, purposes of punishment and 
laws at the time. According to proponents of corporate 
punishment, in the beginning, corporate criminal lia-
bility was in accordance with the nature and character 
of a legal person, because its socialist nature and the 
nature of its activities were not necessarily overlap-
ping all the time. Only when it adjusted its own benefit 
to national interest did its socialist nature integrate 
into its activities. Otherwise, the nature of the legal 
person and that of its activities should be treated as 
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separate entities, and its illegality was right embodi-
ment of the deviation of its activities from its socialist 
nature?.
Corporate punishment was also based on sound 
subjective and objective elements, which were in sub-
stance ingredients in the constitution of a crime. On 
one hand, any legal person had a decision-making unit 
quite similar to a human brain as it instructs and 
directs, that is to say, the decision-making unit inside a 
legal person was exactly its nerve center. Therefore, 
the order and request of the decision-making unit as 
an expression of collective will should be taken as an 
organizational one?. In other words, criminal intent of 
the decision-making unit of a legal person constitutes 
the subjective basis of its criminal liability. On the 
other hand, once established according to law, a legal 
person was capable of engaging in social activities 
within its constitution, and acts of the legal person 
were its commission and/or omission in a legal sense. 
Correspondingly, it didn’t lack objective basis for 
criminal liability as long as it practiced against its con-
stitution or beyond its business scope and thereby 
violated criminal legislation?.
Moreover, although punishments against freedom 
such as fixed-termed imprisonment and surveillance 
provided as principal penalties in criminal law were 
inapplicable to a legal person, criminal fine and con-
fiscation of property were and could function properly. 
By fining and confiscating, the State might realize the 
goal of punishing and checking crime of a culpable 
legal person and inhibit other legal persons from fol-
lowing the disgraceful example. In addition, the State 
could grant law-abiding legal persons to utilize fined 
or confiscated property to create greater economic 
interests. Therefore, it would benefit both the State 
and its citizens to punish criminally responsible legal 
persons and punishment of a legal person didn’t 
amount to the so-called self-punishment of the State?.
Finally, corporate punishment had been recog-
nized by relevant laws, e.g. it was held that Criminal 
Law promulgated in 1979 had already admitted corpo-
rate punishment depending on vicarious liability by 
providing in article 127 that “when an industrial or 
commercial enterprise, in violation of trademark law 
or regulation, counterfeits a registered trademark, peo-
ple directly responsible for the act shall be sentenced 
to fixed-term imprisonment of less than 3 years or 
penal servitude”. Expressions used in the article made 
clear that the actor was an industrial or commercial 
enterprise and people directly responsible for the act 
were just provided as an object of punishment 
instead?. Similar provisions could also be found in 
article 121 punishing tax evasion.
General Principles of Civil Law was quoted as 
another instance. According to article 49 of General 
Principles of Civil Law, under any conditions provided 
in the article, a legal person should bear responsibility, 
in addition, its legal representative might be fined or 
punished by administrative sanction, if the act in ques-
tion constituted a crime, criminal culpability should be 
taken according to law; article 110 also provided that 
if the act in question constituted a crime, an individual 
or a legal representative of a legal person should be 
held criminally culpable, and such stipulations could 
be found in more 10 laws or regulations enacted in the 
mid-1980s?. Therefore, it was suggested that judging 
from civil laws, “a legal person has been recognized 
as a criminal actor and legal representatives should be 
accused in case of crime of a legal person. It is a 
meaningful breakthrough to write crime of a legal per-
son into laws?.”
In addition to laws, proponents insisted that Inter-
pretations and Answers on Application of Law in 
Trying Current Economic Crime Cases (Draft)? 
jointly issued by the Supreme People’s Court (hereaf-
ter SPC) and the Supreme People’s Procuratorte 
(hereafter SPP) on July 18th 1985 also confirmed the 
ability of a legal person to commit the crime of offer-
ing and accepting bribery, because it provided 
different measures that should be taken according to 
varied circumstances in the case that State organs, 
organizations, economic departments inside collective 
enterprises and institutions accepted bribery.
In conclusion, “although traditional criminal the-
ory in China is against crime of a legal person, 
increase of economic crime has proven that crime of a 
legal person is an undeniable fact and damaging eco-
nomic system. Therefore, it is crucial now to rethink 
criminal theory and reason crime of a legal person in 
order to strike illegality by legal persons more effec-
tively?.” However, the standpoint of scholars for 
corporate punishment didn’t gain much support and 
was overwhelmed by arguments deduced by oppo-
nents from theory of criminal liability inherited from 
the former Soviet Union.
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ⅱ　 Arguments against Corporate 
Punishment
Aiming at above arguments, scholars against cor-
porate criminality insisted that, in the first place, 
nature and character of a legal person determined that 
they couldn’t be held criminally culpable. A legal per-
son had to conduct business strictly according to laws 
and its constitution. Only acting within the scope of its 
civil right might its legal representative be indentified 
with it and beyond that scope the real actor should be 
responsible for what he/she did. Therefore, “the objec-
tive nature of system of a legal person decides that a 
legal person can not become a criminal actor?.”
Second, a legal person didn’t have both the sub-
jective and objective elements necessary for criminal 
liability. On one hand, as a kind of social organization, 
a legal person didn’t have its own mind or will, none-
theless a criminal mind. It continued that it lacked the 
subjective elements of criminal liability. On the other 
hand, criminal acts decided and carried out by its deci-
sion-making organ may seem like those by the legal 
person itself, however, how could it have its own 
objective acts without a subjective mind? Conse-
quent ly, re levant ac t s were only objec t ive 
actualizations of the criminal minds of the members of 
its decision-making organ, that is to say, there existed 
no objective basis on which criminal liability of a 
legal person could be constructed?.
Third, to hold a legal person criminally liable 
wasn’t in accordance with the principle of bearing cul-
pability solely for one’s own crime and the purpose of 
punishment. According to this principle, only the one 
who committed a crime should be punished, not those 
with whom one has a certain relationship, but have 
nothing to do with the commission of the crime. In the 
case of a legal person, punishing the legal person 
resulted only in that those who actually committed a 
crime, although on behalf of the legal person, would 
go unpunished and those innocent might be unfairly 
and harmfully affected?. Moreover, the main purpose 
of punishment was to prevent crimes and the precon-
dition that the object to which punishment is applied 
can feel the pain of punishment. However, a legal per-
son wasn’t a living moral agent with a mind, so the 
purpose of punishment couldn’t be realized through 
punishing a legal person?.
Fourth, punishments prescribed in criminal law 
were inapplicable to a legal person. Criminal law pro-
vided death penalty, life imprisonment and fixed-term 
imprisonment, penal servitude and public surveillance 
as principal punishments, none of which could be 
applied to a legal person. Among accessory punish-
ments, deprivation of political rights was naturally 
inapplicable. It might be argued that criminal fine was 
applicable. However, it could be applied indepen-
dently only to crimes like misdemeanor and, 
accordingly, the amount of criminal fine was usually 
small. Therefore, it was obviously unfair and against 
the principle of proportionality that a crime of severe 
nature or circumstances was only punished with a light 
sanction such as a fine. As for confiscation of prop-
erty, according to criminal law, the object of forfeiture 
was supposed to be a criminal’s own property while 
most legal persons were state-owned, and therefore 
the State might just be punishing itself by forfeiting 
property of a legal person. What is more important, “to 
punish a legal person just by fine or confiscation of 
property will impress citizens in the way that it can be 
exempt from criminal punishment just by paying the 
money?.”
Finally, as for articles 121 and 127 of 79 Criminal 
Law, “they should not be used to underlie that an 
enterprise or institution itself has criminal capability 
but that someone may commit crime during represent-
ing an industrial or commercial enterprise or 
institution in conducting business or on its name and 
that’s why the law provides that it isn’t an enterprise 
or institution but those directly responsible who should 
take criminal liability?.” what is more important and 
convincing when Criminal Law was enacted in 1979, 
is that the economic system in China was still a 
highly-centralized planned one, thus it was impossible 
for the legislature to provide crime of a legal person, 
which could barely be found at the time?.
Although it was asserted that both arguments for 
and against corporate punishment weren’t convincing 
and able to build a rational connection between 
respective theoretical preconditions and conclusions, 
or connect them in a wrong way?, the latter appar-
ently prevailed until the adoption of Customs Law of 
The People’s Republic Of China pushed by the gov-
ernment’s anxiety to strike economic crimes 
committed by various units.
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Ⅱ　Establishment Period: 1987-1997
ⅰ　Increase of Corporate Illegality in 1980s
While the feasibility of corporate punishment 
remained controversial, corporate illegality had 
become an extremely harmful social phenomenon, 
endangering economic order and environment. 
According to official statistics, the amount involved in 
smuggling committed by units from 1986-1990 
reached as high as 1.339 billion, which accounted for 
61.8% of that in all smuggling cases. Statistics from 
the National Bureau of Environment Protection also 
showed that enterprises were responsible for the larg-
est part of water and air pollution. Surveys conducted 
on 168 thousands of enterprises from 1985-1987, dis-
covered that the annual discharge of industrial waste 
water was 29.18 billion tons, accounting for 80% of 
the total amount in China; the annual discharge of 
used gas was 716 million m3, 81% of that national 
wide?. Liberation Daily, one of the most important 
official newspapers in China, also reported that Hainan 
province approved the importion of more than 89 
thousand cars in violation of regulations issued by the 
State Council from Jan.1st 1984 to March 5th 1985. By 
the time the case was investigated, 79 thousand had 
been imported and more than 10 thousand had been 
sold around China?.
Such an unexpected impact made more commen-
tators and the legislature aware of the importance of 
criminal response to corporate illegality. “Along with 
progresses in reform of economic system, legal prob-
lems related to a legal person are attracting more and 
more attention at both empirical and theoretical levels. 
Although we now can find provisions regulating activ-
ities of a legal person in economic, civil and 
administrative laws, criminal law hasn’t followed cor-
respondingly. This is a weak point in legal 
researches?.” “criminality of a legal person is a prod-
uct of the time. Therefore, it is one direction to which 
criminal law should be adjusted and request of per-
fecting socialist punishment system to face reality, 
amend and enrich current criminal theory so as to sat-
isfy requirements of development of economic 
relationship and reform of economic system and fur-
ther recognize criminality of a legal person in legal 
system. This will also enable us to understand nature 
of criminal law and punishment from a new and scien-
tific viewpoint?.”
ⅱ　Establishment of Corporate Punishment
Although the standpoint against corporate punish-
ment was still the main-stream in academic circles, 
feeling pressing need to control corporate illegality,the 
Sanding Committee of NPC established corporate 
punishment in Customs Law of China on Jan.22nd 
1987 by providing in article 47 that “where an enter-
prise, an institution or a state organ or a public 
organization is guilty of smuggling, the judicial organ 
shall investigate and determine the criminal responsi-
bility of the person or persons in charge and the person 
or persons directly answerable for the offence.” Then, 
the Standing Committee confirmed its standpoint in a 
separate criminal law tiled Supplementary Provisions 
on Punishing Crime of Smuggling enacted on Jan.21, 
1988, which stipulated in article 5 that “an enterprise, 
an institution or a state organ or a public organization 
that smuggles shall be punished by criminal fine, and 
the person or persons in charge and the person or per-
sons directly answerable for the offence shall be 
punished according to provisions for individual per-
sons.”
Between the adoption of Customs Law in 1987 
and amendment to Criminal Law in 1997, the Stand-
ing Committee enacted 10 separate criminal laws and 
more accessory criminal provisions in economic and 
administrative laws in order to regulate corporations 
and thereby established corporate punishment in 
almost all fields of the economy. Besides the Supple-
mentary Provisions on Punishing Crime of Smuggling, 
other separate criminal laws are: Decision on Prohibi-
t i o n o f  D r u g s e n a c t e d o n D e c . 28 ,  1990 ; 
Supplementary Provisions on Punishment of Evading 
or Refusing to Pay Tax by Violence or Threat on 
Sep.4, 1992; Supplementary Provisions on Forfeiture 
of Registered Marks and Brands on Feb. 22, 1993; 
Supplementary Provisions on Punishing Production 
and Sale of Forfeited Product and Product of inferior 
Quality on July 2, 1993; Supplementary Provisions on 
Making Arrangements for Another Person and Offer-
ing Transportation to Illegally Cross the National 
Border (Frontier) on March 5, 1994; Decisions on 
Infringement on Copyright on July 5, 1994; Decisions 
on Punishment of Crimes against Corporate Law 
Feb.28,1995; Decisions on Punishment of Crimes 
Impairing Financial Order on June 30, 1995; Decision 
on Punishing Crimes of Forging or Selling Forged 
Special Invoices for Value- Added Tax on Oct.30, 
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1995.
Along with promulgation of special laws, new 
theories were also proposed to justify corporate pun-
ishment, among which Liability of Personified Social 
System brought forward by Prof. Bingsong HE of the 
China University of Politics and Legal Science is a 
representative one. Liability of Personified Social Sys-
tem, considered coherent with Organization Liability 
of Corporation advocated by Prof. Hiroshi ITA-
KURA?, holds that a legal person should assume 
criminal culpability in that, “it is a personified organic 
organization with its own unitary will and act and thus 
it has capability of committing a crime and taking 
criminal responsibility. Because not having its own 
body, a legal person can only commit crime through 
conscious act of its representatives or other employ-
ees. Consequently, those substantially responsible for 
the unitary crime should also be accused. In short, in 
criminal case of a legal person, there is only one crime 
(unitary crime of the legal person) but two criminal 
actors (the legal person and the natural person as its 
organizational ingredient) and two punishment objects 
(double punishment) or just one (single punishment). 
This is decided by the fact that unitary structure of a 
legal person is quite special and complex?.”
Generally speaking, the legislation development 
in the beginning of the 1990s made corporate punish-
ment an acceptable and necessary definition to more 
and more legal researchers and legislators although the 
voice against corporate criminality could still be 
heard. However, due to incomplete reform of owner-
ship structures and complex relationships between 
administrative organs and publicly owned business 
entities, “by and large, in China corporate liability has 
been a concept on the books that rarely operates in 
practice” in the 1990s?, the proof is that “few organi-
zations have been convicted or even prosecuted. 
Instead, when an offense is particularly serious, offi-
cials of the corporation are prosecuted as individual 
offenders for the crime committed by the organiza-
tion?.” Furthermore, along with the deepening of 
economic reform, new types of corporate crime kept 
appearing, thus to develop and perfect corporate pun-
ishment became an important task, which was partly 
accomplished by 97 Criminal Law and amendments to 
it. After 1997, the voice against corporate punishment 
became weaker and weaker and most academic atten-
tion was shifted from whether corporations should and 
could be punished, to how to punish corporations in a 
more reasonable and effective way and deal with spe-
cific issues in investigating and prosecuting culpable 
corporations.
Ⅲ　Development Period: after 1997
ⅰ　Criminal Legislation
On Dec.12, 1998, only one year after the adop-
tion of 97 Criminal law, the Standing Committee of 
the NPC enacted a separate criminal law titled, Deci-
sion of Standing Committee of People’s Congress on 
Punishing Purchasing Foreign Exchange by Defraud-
ing, Depositing Foreign Exchange outside China by 
Illegal Way and Unlawful Trade of Foreign Exchange, 
which was intended to protect foreign exchange 
reserve and safeguard financial stability in China dur-
ing the far-reaching Asian financial crisis at end of the 
1990s and established a new crime referred to as, 
crime of purchasing foreign exchange by defraud-
ing. Since the Decision, the Standing Committee has 
adopted 6 amendments to 97 Criminal Law, half arti-
cles of which deal with corporate punishment. 
According to their contents, stipulations in the above 
legislative documents can be classified into 3 catego-
ries.
The first category is that establishing new crimes, 
such as article 4 of Amendment (III), article 4 of 
Amendment (IV) and article 3 of Amendment (VI). 
One common feature of these articles is that they are 
all inserted into an existing article as the first para-
graph, e.g. article 4 of Amendment (IV) provides that, 
“the following article shall be inserted into article 244 
of 97 Criminal Law as Paragraph I of the article,” and 
thereby creates a new crime protecting minors under 
the age of 16 from being hired to conduct extremely 
intensive physical labor, work at high altitudes or 
work in wells or work in an explosive, flammable, 
radioactive or poisonous environment.
The second is that expanding the scope of punish-
ment. The first approach is to extend corporate 
punishment to more subjects by modifying description 
of crimes, e.g. article 8 of Amendment (IV) changes 
paragraph I of article 164 of 97 Criminal Law into, 
“Whoever, for the purpose of seeking illegitimate ben-
efits, gives money or property to any employee of a 
company, enterprise or other units, if the amount 
involved is relatively large??.” Compared to the 
original prescription?, the amendment extended the 
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criminal actor of the given crime from “any employee 
of a company or enterprise” to “any employee of a 
company, enterprise or other units”. The main reason 
that legislature inserted “other units” is the debate on 
whether doctors accepting bribery should be prose-
cuted according to article 164 or article 385 of 97 
Criminal Law.
The special anti-commercial crime campaign 
launched in 2006, intended to restore market rule and 
authority to the government, disclosed that offering 
and accepting bribery is such a common practice in 
China’s pharmaceutical industry that it annually 
robbed 772 million RMB of state assets, or about 16% 
of all taxes paid by the industry for the whole year?. 
Before adoption of Amendment (VI), there were two 
articles punishing individuals accepting bribery, article 
164 and article 385 of 97 Criminal Law, but neither 
was applicable to doctors. As mentioned above, article 
164 could only be applied to an “employee of a com-
pany or enterprise” and article 385 punishes only a 
“State functionary”?, while doctors are neither 
employees of a company or enterprise nor State func-
tionaries, since hospitals to which doctors belong are 
Stated-owned institutions. Therefore, a leading profes-
sor of criminal law concluded that doctors taking 
bribes shouldn’t be punished according to criminal 
law?. On one side, illegality of medical organizations 
was so serious and widely spread that it was endanger-
ing the whole pharmaceutical industry, on the other 
side, judicial organs were unable to punish it with 
criminal penalty, considered the most powerful tool to 
strike crime. Therefore, legislature made the decision 
to amend article 164 of 97 Criminal Law.
Another category is to change crime pattern, e.g. 
article 1 of Amendment (IV) amended article 145 of 
97 Criminal Law into, “Whoever produces medical 
apparatus and instruments or medical hygiene materi-
als that are not up to the national or trade standards for 
safeguarding human health or sells such things while 
clearly knowing the fact, and if it is serious enough to 
endanger human health, shall be sentenced to??.” 
This article converted the crime in question from a 
crime of consequence, established in the original pro-
vision?, to one of potential damage by substituting 
“causing serious harm to human health” with “seri-
ous enough to endanger human health” and thereby 
extended punishment to acts that haven’t caused, yet 
are potential to cause, actual harm.
The last one is to provide more severe punish-
ments, e.g. article 3 of Decision of Standing 
Committee of People’s Congress on Punishing Pur-
chasing Foreign Exchange by Defrauding, Depositing 
Foreign Exchange outside China by Illegal Way and 
Unlawful Trade of Foreign Exchange provides that 
article 190 of 97 Criminal Law shall read as: Any 
State-owned company, enterprise or any other State-
owned unit that, against State regulations, deposits 
foreign exchange outside China or illegally transfers 
foreign exchange inside China out to any other coun-
tries shall, if??the amount is especially large or 
there exist other serious circumstances, be fined more 
than 5% but less than 30% of the amount of deposited 
or transferred and the persons who are directly in 
charge and the other persons who are directly respon-
sible for the crime shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of more than five years. Compared to 
the original provision?, the maximum penalty was 
substantively increased from “not more than five 
years” to “more than five years”, with the possibility 
of 15 years.
ⅱ　Judicial Interpretation
In addition to criminal legislation enacted by the 
Standing Committee of the NPC, judicial interpreta-
tions in various forms issued by the SPC and the SPP 
regarding specific issues also play important roles in 
perfecting corporate punishment. These interpretations 
are (1)Official Answer on How to Apply Laws to For-
eign Corporation, Enterprise and Institution that 
Committed Crime in Territory of China issued by 
Department of Policy and Law Research of SPC?; (2) 
Official Answer on How to Prosecute an Unit Crimi-
nally Suspected on the Case that It was Canceled or 
went Bankruptcy, Its Registration was Nullified or Its 
Business Licenses Revoked issued by Department of 
Policy and Law Research of the SPP?; (3) Sugges-
tions on Application of Law in Criminal Smuggling 
Cases jointly enacted by SPC, SPP and General 
Administration of Customs?; (4) Summary of Meet-
ings of Courts of All Levels on Trying Financial 
Crimes issued by the SPC?; (5) Official Reply on 
Whether Principal Actor or Accessory Actor should be 
Recognized among Persons directly in Charge and 
Other People directly responsible for in Trying Unit 
Crime by the SPC?; (6) Interpretation on Application 
of Law in Trying Unit Crime by the SPC?; (7) Inter-
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pretation on Application of Law in Trying Criminal 
Cases of Purchasing Foreign Exchange by Defrauding 
and Unlawful Trade of Foreign Exchange by the 
SPC?.
Ⅳ　Comments
Generally speaking, the birth and development of 
corporate punishment in China followed the course of 
those countries that extended criminal liability from 
individuals to corporations: first, the State was con-
fronted with massive violations of the law by 
corporations; then, the State looked for effective coun-
termeasures to control corporate illegality; finally, the 
State decided to make use of criminal penalty by 
establishing corporate criminal liability, just like what 
was said in England: “in England, historically, corpo-
rations were considered in capable of committing any 
crimes, as Pope Innocent IV noted in 1250, corpora-
tions have no souls,??consequently, early English 
courts held that criminal liability cannot be applied to 
corporations?.” However, “as industrialization began 
to spread across England in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, the English courts were confronted with 
violations of law committed by railroads, and they 
responded by holding that corporate entity could be 
prosecuted for a criminal omission?.” Therefore, it 
was “the fear that no other means are available to 
check the growing activities, lawful as well as unlaw-
ful, of corporate bodies, has dictated several pieces of 
legislation imposing corporate criminal liability, espe-
cially immediately preceding and during World War II
?? there few statutes must be regarded as odd 
exceptions to the otherwise firmly entrenched rule that 
corporations cannot be subjected to criminal liabil-
ity?.” In other words, the history of corporate 
punishment implies that it is the need to punish corpo-
rations causing damage to society and belief in the 
deterrent effect of criminal sanctions that gave birth to 
corporate punishment and theoretical explanation was 
just there to justify corporate punishment; it might be 
more proper to say that corporate liability was created 
than to say that it was deduced from traditional theory 
of criminal liability.
The history of corporate punishment in China has 
also made it clear that legislature, shocked by the size 
and increased pace of corporate crime and stimulated 
by desire to control to it, has adopted and developed 
corporate punishment without proper theoretical prep-
aration, the scope of corporate crime offering a sound 
proof. Except in countries that impose criminal liabil-
ity upon corporations for all offences, such as South 
Africa?, the following approaches are usually taken as 
a standard by States in deciding the scope of corporate 
crime. The first is division of administrative and 
natural offences, which requires that corporate crime 
should be limited to administrative offences; the sec-
ond is corporate nature holding that a corporation 
may be held culpable only if its nature shows that it is 
capable of committing the crime in question. This 
approach explains the fact that corporations are con-
sidered capable of committing all crimes in principle 
except for those such as rape, perjury or bigamy in 
America and the U.K.; the last is corporate activity, 
which suggests that a corporation should be culpable 
for a crime as long as it relates to its activities to a 
degree?.
However, none of the above standards could be 
used to explain the inclusion of one act and the exclu-
sion of another within the scope of corporate crime in 
China. Corporate crimes provided in current criminal 
laws (see appendix) include both administrative and 
natural offences; therefore division of administrative 
and natural offences obviously can’t work. Then, as 
noted above, the approach of corporate nature implies 
that corporations are capable of committing nearly all 
crimes except for a few typical natural crimes requir-
ing human body acts or individual minds, but many 
crimes that should be provided as corporate ones 
according to this, still are not by 97 Criminal Law. 
Finally, the standard of corporate activity also can’t 
explain why acts stipulated in the same section of 97 
Criminal Law, which might be said aims to regulate 
corporate activities in essence, e.g. section IV of 
Chapter III on protection of financial order, are treated 
in different ways. Absence of a definite standard in 
deciding the scope of corporate crime leads to difficul-
ties for academic researchers in rationalizing corporate 
criminality and managers of corporations in drawing a 
rough line between lawful and unlawful activities, in 
turn, the function of offering a conduct norm in crimi-
nal law is impaired.
3.  Legislation of Corporate Punishment 
in China
Ⅰ　Corporate Crimes in Criminal Laws
Corporate crime may be defined in more than one 
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way in theory, but according to article 30 of 97 Crimi-
nal Law, corporate crime refers to an act committed by 
a corporation and prescribed as a crime by criminal 
laws?. It is worth mentioning that on the occasion that 
a branch or an inside department of a corporation 
commits a crime on its own behalf and also possesses 
all criminal proceeds, the crime in question should still 
be dealt with as a corporate one according to Sum-
mary of Meetings of Courts of All Levels on Trying 
Financial Crimes issued by the SPC on Jan.1st, 2001.
Distribution of 142 corporate crimes in 9 of 10 
Chapters in Specific Part of 97 Criminal Law and the 
separate criminal law enacted in 1998 (see appendix) 
corresponds to legislature’s aim to control corpora-
tions’ influence on social order, especially on 
economic order and business organization nature of 
corporations: 59% are crimes disrupting the order of 
the socialist market economy in Chapter III, 25% are 
those obstructing the administration of public order in 
Chapter VI and 6% are those endangering public secu-
rity in Chapter II. Corporate crimes in the remaining 6 
chapters account for only 10%. (See Graph I).
ⅰ　Standard/Non-Standard Corporate Crime
According to whether a corporate crime can be 
committed only by a corporation or not, corporate 
crimes in current criminal laws may be divided into 
standard corporate crimes and non-standard corporate 
crimes. The former refers to crimes whose actors are 
limited to corporations, e.g. article 137 of 97 Criminal 
Law stipulates that where any building, designing, 
construction or engineering supervision unit, in vio-
lation of State regulations, lowers the quality standard 
of a project and thereby causes a serious accident, the 
person who is directly responsible for the accident 
shall be punished. The word “unit” in this article defi-
nitely excludes the possibility that an individual can 
become the actor of the crime. Standard corporate 
crimes account for only a small part of all corporate 
crimes, including Manufacturing or selling guns in 
violation of regulations (article 126), Causing a seri-
ous accident and Causing a serious safety accident in 
large-scale activities of the masses (article 135), Caus-
ing a serious accident in a construction project (article 
137), Causing a serious accident in educational facili-
ties (article 138), Causing an accident fire prevention 
(article 139), Illegally Disclosing or concealing critical 
information (article 161), Impairing liquidation (article 
162), Depositing foreign exchange outside China or 
illegally transferring foreign exchange (article 190), 
Forcing employees to work and Employing minors to 
do dangerous jobs or jobs with heavy physical labor 
(article 244), Misappropriation of funds or materials 
allocated for special purposes (article 273), Illegally 
selling or presenting as gifts without permission cul-
tural relic in collection (article 327), Unlawfully 
collecting or supplying blood or making or supplying 
blood products (article 334), Accepting bribe of an 
unit (article 387), Offering bribe of an unit (article 
393) and Illegally dividing fine or confiscated money 
or property (article 396).
Non-standard corporate crimes are those whose 
subject can either be an individual or a corporation. 97 
Criminal Law prescribes non-standard corporate 
crimes in two ways. One is to insert a paragraph into 
an article stipulating that the above crime may also be 
committed by a corporation, e.g. article 152 provides 
in the first paragraph that whoever, for the purpose of 
making profits or dissemination, smuggles porno-
graphic materials shall be held criminally responsible, 
then in the second paragraph it states that in the case a 
corporation committed the crime, the corporation 
??????? ???????????????????????? ?????????????????
59%
25%
6%2%
1%1%4%
1%
1%
ch.1
ch.4
ch.2
ch.5
ch.3
ch.6
ch.7 ch.8 ch.9
88
????????????????
should be fined, and the persons directly in charge and 
other persons directly responsible for the crime shall 
be punished in accordance with the provisions of the 
preceding paragraph. The other is to stipulate in an 
independent article at the end of a section that corpo-
rations may become actors of crimes in previous 
articles, e.g. article 150 provides that where a corpora-
tion commits crimes as mentioned in articles 141 to 
148 of this Section (Section 1of Chapter 3, crimes of 
producing and marketing fake or substandard com-
modities), it shall be fined, and the persons directly in 
charge and other persons directly responsible for the 
crime shall be punished in accordance with the provi-
sions of relevant articles respectively.
ⅱ　Disputes on Scope of Corporate Crime
The scope of corporate crime isn’t uncontrover-
sial among Chinese scholars. It is argued that crimes 
stipulated in articles 107, 135, 137, 138, 139, 161, 
162, 229, 244, 250, 396 and 403 aren’t corporate 
crimes but those of a natural person?. Reasons given 
might be summarized as following: (i) corporations 
can neither directly be listed as criminal actors nor 
punished in some crimes such as those in articles 135, 
137, 138 and 139, which only punish persons directly 
in charge or those directly responsible for?; (ii) the 
purpose of benefiting a corporation doesn’t exist in 
crimes such as those established in articles 161, 162 
and 229, because corporations can also be considered 
as victims?; (iii) acts in certain crimes such as the 
crime of forcing employees to work in article 244 can 
only be conducted by a natural person?. However, 
these arguments are unconvincing in terms of expres-
sions used in 97 Criminal Law or criminal policy.
Section 4 of Chapter 2 of General part of 97 
Criminal Law is specifically designed for unit crime, 
article 31 of the Section states that: where a unit com-
mits a crime, it shall be fined, and the persons who are 
directly in charge and other persons who are directly 
responsible for the crime shall be given criminal 
punishment. This article makes it a rule that the 
expressions, “persons who are directly in charge” and 
“persons who are directly responsible for the crime” 
only appear “where a unit commits a crime”. There-
fore, all crimes should be corporate ones as long as the 
articles in which they are established use the expres-
sion “persons who are directly in charge” or/and 
“persons who are directly responsible for the crime” 
and all articles mentioned above do.
Furthermore, the positive standpoint has a pro-
found policy implication. A corporate crime usually 
causes considerable loss to a number of victims. 
Although article 36 of 97 Criminal Law provides that, 
“if a victim has suffered economic losses as a result of 
a crime, the criminal shal, in addition to receiving a 
criminal punishment according to law, be sentenced to 
making compensation for the economic losses in the 
light of the circumstances,” a victim won’t be able to 
actually receive compensation if the criminal were 
economically incapable to pay it. Comparatively 
speaking, corporations are usually much wealthier and 
have more obstacles to overcome in concealing their 
property than individuals. Therefore, to treat crimes in 
the articles mentioned above as corporate ones is also 
to help realize the purpose of punishment to restore 
societal harmony by calming and compensating vic-
tims while punishing offenders.
Ⅱ　Corporate Punishment in Criminal Law
ⅰ　 Double Punishment and Single 
Punishment
Article 31 of 97 Criminal Law establishes double 
punishment for corporate crime in principle. Accord-
ing to the article, in the case of a corporate crime, the 
corporation should be punished by fine and individu-
als involved should also be given punishments 
stipulated for natural persons in corresponding articles. 
Meanwhile, the article allows for exceptions by pro-
viding, where it is provided otherwise by related laws, 
those provisions shall be given priority. Therefore, 
besides double punishment, the Law may also only 
punish those directly in charge or responsible for the 
crime on some occasions. This practice is referred to 
as single punishment in academic studies.
As for criminal corporations, the only punishment 
is criminal fine provided in article 35 of 97 Criminal 
Law as a supplementary punishment. Moreover, legis-
lation doesn’t exert much of a limit on the amount of 
fine other than a quite simple and vague statement in 
article 52 that, “amount of any fine imposed shall be 
determined according to the circumstances of the 
crime”. In other words, the discretion on application 
of a fine solely, and almost unrestrictedly, rests with 
the courts. Legislature provides punishment for natural 
persons culpable in corporate crimes following two 
approaches. One is to apply the same punishments for 
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natural persons in non-standard corporate crimes, e.g. 
paragraph 1 of article 189 stipulates that any employee 
of a bank or of any other banking institution who com-
mits the crime of accepting, paying or guaranteeing 
unlawful, negotiable instruments shall be sentenced to 
fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years 
or criminal detention; if especially heavy losses are 
caused, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprison-
ment of not less than five years. The following 
paragraph continues to provide that in the case of a 
corporate crime, the corporation shall be fined, and the 
culpable persons shall be punished according to the 
provisions in the preceding paragraph. The other is to 
provide special punishments for natural persons, e.g. 
paragraph 1 of article 180 provides that he who com-
mits the crime of inside trade shall be sentenced to 
fixed-term imprisonment of less than 5 years or crimi-
nal detention, or imprisonment of more than 5 years 
but less than 10 years. Paragraph 2 continues to pro-
vide that in the case of a corporate crime, “the persons 
who are directly in charge and other persons who are 
directly responsible for the crime shall be sentenced to 
fixed-term imprisonment of not more than 5 years or 
criminal detention.”
Single punishment, similar to vicarious liability 
applied in common law countries, is adopted in only a 
few articles regarding corporate crimes, such as arti-
cles 135, 137, 138 and 139. One feature shared by 
these corporate crimes is that they are almost all 
crimes of negligence, which are usually thought by 
drafters and legislators to be less dangerous and harm-
ful to society than intentional crimes, although not 
from the standpoint of victims.
ⅱ　 Persons Directly in Charge and Persons 
Directly Responsible for
“Persons directly in charge” and “persons directly 
responsible for” are two expressions repeatedly used 
in criminal law in China. How is it determined that an 
individual involved in a corporate crime is the one 
directly in charge or one directly responsible for the 
crime? Based on different structures of corporations 
and posts a natural person holds in corporate manage-
ment, various standards have been brought forward 
since the enforcement of 97 Criminal Law, e.g. four 
opinions that are similar in core, yet different in exten-
sion have been suggested for identifying persons 
directly in charge: (1) persons directly in charge are 
those who function as an organizer, director or deci-
sion-maker?; (2) the substantial decision-makers in 
the implementation of a corporate crime are persons 
directly in charge?; (3) to identify someone as a per-
son directly in charge two conditions should be 
satisfied, one is that he should take direct responsibil-
ity and the other is that he held a post of supervision?, 
and (4) leaders at higher level who secretly inspire, 
recklessly connive or even publicly support crimes 
perpetrated by their subordinates and those who orga-
nize, direct or determine should be punished as 
persons directly in charge?.
Disputes among scholars and the absence of 
authoritative interpretations led to inconsistency and 
even conflict in practice. As a try and effort to offer a 
transparent and feasible standard, the Supreme Court 
issued Summary of Meetings of Courts of All Levels 
on Trying Financial Crimes in 2001, which defines 
persons directly in charge and those directly responsi-
ble for in the following way: persons directly in charge 
are those who decide, approve, direct, inspire or con-
nive in implementing a crime. They are usually 
decision-makers in a corporation including the legal 
representative. Other persons directly responsible for 
the crime refers to those who play a relatively impor-
tant role in implementing the crime, they can be a 
manager, a supervisor or average employees. How-
ever, those who are assigned or ordered to take part in 
a corporate crime shall not be held culpable as persons 
directly responsible for. Persons directly in charge and 
persons directly responsible for a corporate crime 
should be punished respectively in accordance with 
their position, rule and circumstances in the crime?.
Although the above Summary was criticized and 
thought to be one that unreasonably restricts the scope 
of persons directly in charge and unable to offer a 
completely feasible standard of deciding whether a 
person is the one that should be held directly responsi-
ble in a corporate crime?, it would be fair to say that 
the Summary settles academic disputes and clarifies 
stipulations in article 31 of 97 Criminal Law. How-
ever, it isn’t safe to say that the explanation in the 
Summary is thoroughly feasible and leaves no place 
for argument, because any word is capable of being 
interpreted in more than one way. Therefore, if a fur-
ther explanation is desired, it might be a wise choice 
for the SPC to set up some precedents, which has been 
considered by both judges and researchers as an effi-
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cient and acceptable way to standardize application of 
law and objective request of judicial practice and 
capable of becoming judicial interpretation with 
legally binding force?.
ⅲ　 Double Leniency for Individuals Culpable 
for Corporate Crime
Another feature in corporate punishment worthy 
of being mentioned is that punishments for individuals 
culpable in corporate crimes are usually much more 
lenient than those for individuals in crimes of a natural 
person, e.g. according to article 180 of 97 Criminal 
Law, the most severe punishment for an individual in 
the case of a corporate crime is 5 years, while other-
wise the maximum punishment may reach as much as 
10 years. The main reason for such leniency is that 
individuals in corporate crimes usually act for corpo-
rate benefits instead of their own and “‘for corporate 
benefit’is the foundation on which an individual acts, 
and it after all is more virtuous than ‘for individual 
benefit’. Consequently, the former is worth being rec-
ognized as a mitigating circumstance in law?.” 
However, this might be an illogical explanation. Com-
pared to individual crime, corporate crime committed 
through natural persons usually cause much greater 
damage to victims and society, punishments for indi-
viduals in corporate crimes therefore should be at least 
no lighter than those for individual crime, because, as 
Cesare Beccaria stated more than two hundred years 
ago, “the means made use of by the legislature to pre-
vent crimes should be more powerful in proportion as 
they are destructive of the public safety and happiness, 
and as the inducements to commit them are stron-
ger?.”
The fact that empirical studies have shown that 
judges are also inclined to give natural persons respon-
sible for corporate crimes a lighter sentence for the 
purpose of obtaining more interests, not for individu-
als, but for corporations, makes the leniency more 
unjustifiable. This double lenience choice can be 
excessively harmful to the function and aim of corpo-
rate punishment and needs to be rethought, just as 
Japanese scholars stated after reviewing criminal cases 
of corporate tax evasion from 2002 to 2003, “Based 
on the fact that corporate crime has two types of 
motives ? “corporate interest”  and “personal inter-
est”  ?court decisions often suggest that the type of 
motive a defendant had may affect sentencing.?? We 
found that “corporate interest”  has a negative effect 
on sentencing. We think that the result is reasonable 
from a social standpoint but isn’ t justifiable from a 
standpoint of crime deterrent. Therefore, we argue 
that we should rethink criminal liability and crime 
deterrents in sentencing theory in cases of corporate 
crime?.”
4. Practice of Corporate Punishment
Due to the absence of systematically collected 
and officially published data on convicted corpora-
tions and corresponding sentences, it is impossible to 
give an overall and accurate description of the practice 
of corporate punishment in China. However, as noted 
above, nearly all crimes in Chapter III of Specific Part 
of 97 Criminal Law may be committed by a corpora-
tion and are actually in practice, so we might get a 
general understanding on the current situation of cor-
porate crime and the efficacy of corporate punishment 
from annual statistics of crimes of disrupting order of 
socialist market economy settled at first instance by 
people’s courts at all levels in China. According to sta-
tistics published by the China National Bureau of 
Statistics from 1998 to 2007?, criminal cases of dis-
rupting order of socialist market economy increased 
rapidly from 1997 to 2000, which may have resulted 
from the fact that 97 Criminal Law changed many 
criminal acts that used to be charged as crimes of a 
natural person into corporate crimes. Then, from 2000 
to 2004, it decreased slightly. However, it has been 
again increasing since 2004, partly because of the spe-
cial anti-commercial crime campaign. It might be 
inferred from the comparatively stable amount of 
cases settled since 2000 (see Graph II below) that 
China has been keeping tough on criminal corpora-
tions and is becoming even tougher, as can be seen by 
the quick increase in cases handled by courts after 
2004, yet it may also be said that continuous increase 
of corporate cases implies we shouldn’t expect too 
much from corporate punishment.
Moreover, China has shown its resolution in pun-
ishing high-level officials and powerful State organs 
involved in corporate crimes. On Apr.7th, 2008, Rong-
kun ZHANG, one of the key defendants in the 
so-called Shanghai Social Security Fund Case, was 
convicted of five crimes including corporate bribery 
and sentenced to 19-year imprisonment. Two invest-
ment corporations listed as defendants at the same 
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time were also convicted and respectively fined 230 
million and 50 million RMB, the former might be the 
highest fine in the history of corporate punishment in 
China?. What is more important, is that it is Zhang 
and his corporations that led to investigation of Shang-
hai Social Security Fund Case and convictions of more 
than 30 major officials in Shanghai including Liangyu 
CHEN, former member of Political Bureau of Central 
Committee and secretary of Shanghai Committee of 
Communist Party of China. Two years prior, Wuru-
muqi Intermediate People’s Court of Railway 
Transportation of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 
of China became the first State organ that was charged 
with accepting bribery from corporations in July 
2006?. This case is constructively meaningful as it is 
the first one in which a court that was authorized by 
the Constitution to punish was prosecuted.
However, continuous and severe punishment of 
criminally liable corporations does not seem to be 
working as an effective deterrent element and corpo-
rate crime is still a dooming threat in China, e.g. 
according to China Youth Daily published on Jan.12th 
of 2007, humiliated by tax evasion by real estate cor-
porations, the State Council of China ordered the State 
Administration of Taxation to conduct a special 
inspection on tax payment of real estate corporations 
in Shijiazhuang, capital of Hebei province. According 
to the latter’s authorization, the National Tax Bureau 
and Local Tax Bureau of Hebei province were jointly 
in charge of inspecting 100 major corporations in Shi-
jiazhuang. The result was more than surprising in that 
tax evasion was so common that nearly all corpora-
tions inspected committed illegal activities such as tax 
evasion. According to the National Tax Bureau of Shi-
jiazhuang assigned by the National Tax Bureau of 
Hebei province, the total amount of income tax evaded 
by only 20 real estates corporations it inspected was as 
high as 896.6 million RMB within the short period of 
2003 to 2005?.
Why isn’t corporate punishment functioning as 
legislature anticipated? This might be explained at two 
levels. One is the actual enforcement of law and appli-
cation of corporate punishment. Certainty, swiftness 
and severity have always been considered as the most 
important factors influencing the deterrent value of 
punishment?. Therefore, in order to effectively pre-
vent corporate crime, law-enforcement agencies 
should make sure that all parties involved in a corpo-
rate crime be investigated and punished as soon as 
possible while paying due respect to procedural jus-
tice, at least in a case that has already been under 
investigation. To be more specific, in cases of offering 
bribes committed by corporations, law-enforcement 
agencies should stress not only punishing accepting 
parties but also offering parties. However, the former, 
most of which are State functionaries, are much more 
likely to be prosecuted than the latter in China. 
According to the Ministry of Public Security, from 
2000 to June 2006, public security organs investigated 
2529 cases of accepting bribery committed by corpo-
rate employees, but only 564 cases of offering bribes 
to corporate employees?. Besides, the annual report 
of 2007 of the SPC also disclosed that there were only 
359 bribery cases involving employees at enterprises 
or corporations, while there were 8310 cases in which 
State functionaries were convicted of accepting brib-
ery by courts of all levels in 2006?. Numerous 
notorious cases may offer more direct and vivid proof. 
In a case that stirred the political circle of Yunnan 
province, the accused was prosecuted and convicted of 
accepting bribery of more than 40 million Yuan, while 
the corporation with its headquarters located in 
Guangdong province that offered 32 million RMB in 
bribes, which was reported as the largest bribe sum in 
the history of the P.R.C, and its director in general 
have not been punished according to public reports?. 
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Consequently, corporations are excessively vulnerable 
when facing an opportunity of gaining an unexpect-
edly large profit by offering a small bribe, while the 
chance of being punished is quite narrow. The other is 
design of corporate punishment, which will be dis-
cussed in detail in the following part.
5.  Future Reform of Corporate 
Punishment
In order to work as an efficient deterrent element 
and not be considered as part of routine costs by cor-
porations, corporate punishment itself should be 
directed at causes of corporate crime and able to be 
applied flexibly while abiding by the basic principles 
of criminal law. It is in this field that corporate punish-
ment in China has great space for improvement, thus 
the need to reform corporate punishment has become a 
commonly recognized opinion among Chinese schol-
ars, judges and prosecutors and proposals have also 
been brought forward. These proposals may be divided 
into two categories, one is to diversify corporate pun-
ishment and the other is to establish procedural 
enforcement systems to ensure proper application of 
corporate punishment. As voluminous works on this 
subject already exist, it is neither necessary nor mean-
ingful to reiterate those suggestions?. This article will 
only try to outline future reform of corporate punish-
ment in China from a broader perspective by 
discussing three legislative principles in reforming 
corporate punishment that might be helpful to the real-
ization of its purposes.
Ⅰ　Specifying Corporate Punishment
To diversify punishments against corporate crime 
is a necessary and common choice of countries pun-
ishing corporate crime, e.g. France, which hadn’t 
recognized corporate criminality until 1994, provides 
9 types punishments for criminal corporations in addi-
tion to fines, namely, dissolution, prohibition of one or 
several professional or social activities, placement, 
closing permanently or temporarily, preclusion, prohi-
bition against making public offerings, prohibition 
against making payments by check, confiscation and 
posting a notice?. However, the ultimate purpose of 
licensing punishments in criminal law is not to punish, 
but to offer norms of conduct according to which per-
sons, natural and legal, can anticipate how the law will 
react to their commission or omission and thereby 
make the wise choice. In this sense, it would be more 
helpful to give citizens and organizations a clear and 
definite picture of matching acts with likely results, 
especially in the case that punitive results mean loss of 
freedom, property or even life. Therefore, no matter 
what and how many punishments against corporate 
crime might be adopted into criminal law, it would 
benefit both the State and corporations to specify cor-
porate punishments. As a first and urgent step, Chinese 
legislature needs to improve provisions concerning 
fine and its application.
Fine is preferred to incarceration by the economic 
theory of optimal penalties in that the latter is socially 
costly?, and the motive of criminal corporations to 
gain profit by illegal means even made scholars 
believe that fine might be, “viewed as the most appro-
priate punishment (taxes) for corporate criminals as 
monetary costs can be calculated and incorporated into 
the firm or managerial decision choice?”. 97 Criminal 
Law provides that a criminal corporation should be 
punished by fine in General Part and confirms it in 
Specific Part. However, it expresses it in quite an 
ambiguous way. As for corporate crimes, except a few 
articles scaling a fine to value involved in specific 
crimes?, the typical expression is that, “Where a unit 
commits a crime, it shall be fined,” without other lim-
its or interpretations. Although the SPC enacted 
Regulations on Application of Punishment of Property 
on 15th Nov.2000, it doesn’t help much as it only pro-
vides in article 2 that the People’s Court should decide 
the amount of fine according to circumstances of the 
crime in question, such as criminal proceeds and loss 
caused and the perpetrator’s capability of paying the 
fine. Where there isn’t a stipulation on the amount of 
fine, the minimum amount shall be no less than 1000 
Yuan?.
The vaguer the legislation is, the more important 
judges’ discretion becomes. Discretion is necessary 
for a judge in choosing an appropriate punishment to 
fit a crime, after all, it is beyond any legislature’s 
capability to create a code which a judge may apply 
word for word without any further interpretation in the 
way Cesare Beccaria desired: “in every criminal case 
the judge should reason syllogistically. The major 
should be the general law; the minor, the conformity 
of the action, or its opposition to the laws; the conclu-
sion, liberty, or punishment. If the judge be obliged by 
the imperfection of the laws, or chooses to make any 
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other or more syllogisms than this, it will be an intro-
duction to uncertainty?.” However, excessive 
discretion may lead to the danger that judicial discre-
tion trespasses into legislative territory, which is 
against the universally accepted rationale of division 
of powers. Moreover, ambiguousness in legislation 
also has the potential to cause chaos in practice. 
Therefore, proper limitation on fines and their applica-
tion is necessary, just as America does in “2004 
Federal Sentencing Guideline Manual Sentencing of 
Organizations”.
According to the Guideline Manual, when decid-
ing the amount of fine, a judge needs to first figure out 
a base fine, which can be the greatest amount listed in 
the Guideline Manual, the pecuniary gain to the orga-
nization from the offense or the pecuniary loss from 
the offense caused by the organization, then using the 
culpability score and applying any applicable special 
instructions for fines in Chapter Two, determine the 
applicable minimum and maximum fine multipliers 
from the table it provides, furthermore, take into con-
sideration policy elements such as the need for the 
sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, any 
collateral consequences of conviction including civil 
obligations arising from the organization’s conduct, 
any nonpecuniary loss caused or threatened by the 
offense and any prior criminal record of an individual 
within high-level personnel of the organization or 
high-level personnel of a unit of the organization who 
participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of 
the criminal conduct?.
Such detailed prescription serves the purposes of 
corporate punishment in two ways. One is that it 
enables an organization to be aware of how much it 
might lose if its commission or omission was found 
and prosecuted before carrying out its crime plan. If 
calculated loss outweighed possible proceeds, it might 
choose to drop the plan, in other words, the potential 
crime is prevented. The other is that it also enables 
average citizens to figure out roughly what the amount 
of the fine is in a given case and then decide whether 
judgment of the court is in accordance with the law. If 
the answer were positive, authority of judges would be 
strengthened and citizens’ belief in justice enhanced, 
which would in turn better the image of punishment 
and make it more acceptable.
How can fines be specified in the case of China? 
Taking into consideration requirements of preciseness, 
applicability and flexibility, the following way might 
be feasible. First, establish a base fine like the Ameri-
can Guideline Manual does. The base fine may be the 
greatest of (1) amount of sales, (2) monetary proceeds, 
(3) monetary loss a corporate crime causes, (4) other 
amounts involved in a crime or (5) monetary expendi-
ture made to eliminate harmful influence caused by a 
corporate crime. Then, provide a percentage or both a 
maximum and minimum percentage within the scope 
of which judges may decide an amount according to 
the circumstances in a given case, such as nature of 
crime, societal loss and policy considerations. Third, 
the SPC edits guiding cases to offer direct and vivid 
instruction in the form of judicial interpretation or trial 
reference.
Another problem worthy of being discussed here 
is whether a judge should take into account paying 
capability of a criminal corporation when deciding the 
amount of fine. According to the Regulations on 
Application of Punishment of Property, the capability 
of a criminal corporation in paying a fine is an influ-
encing element and this standpoint has also gained 
academic support?. Insofar as I am concerned, this 
practice might help improve the enforcement rate of a 
sentence, but is harmful to the purposes of corporate 
fine. On one hand, owing to unfriendly cooperation 
among different administrative regions and units and 
comparatively loose financial monitoring, a suspected 
or accused corporation can easily transfer its funds 
among different banks or bank accounts, conceal its 
fixed assets, falsely go bankrupt or set fraudulent 
mortgage, thereby leaving no property for enforce-
ment upon the moment sentence is handed out. What’s 
worse, is that no strong effort has been made or coun-
termeasure taken against such malicious activities?. 
Therefore, if paying capability of criminal corpora-
tions was allowed for as an element in determining the 
amount of fine, the final amount might be surprisingly 
low or disproportionate to criminal proceeds. In con-
sequence, the fine will fail to function as a deterrent 
factor. On the other hand, the practice may lead to cor-
ruption as criminal corporations and judges may make 
underground deals and encourage criminal corpora-
tions to decrease their paying capability by all means 
necessary, lawful or unlawful.
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Ⅱ　 Designing Corporate Punishment 
according to Market Mechanism
Why do corporations become criminals? The 
external reason might be that economic management 
and market control grant them chances to commit ille-
gality, just as was said in the 1970s when America was 
greatly impacted by corporate crime, “the changes in 
our economic structure, particularly with respect to 
marketing, distribution, and investment, have resulted 
in increases in economic crimes at a rate that exceeds 
the rate of population growth?.” The internal reason 
might be factors inside a corporation such as manage-
ment structure and ownership, for instance, an 
empirical study has shown that “crime occurs less fre-
quently among firms in which management has a 
larger ownership stake?.” The bond between the 
external and internal sides is market mechanism, 
which a corporation has to adapt itself to and make 
wise use of in order to survive and profit, and it is in 
this process that most corporate criminality occurs. 
Therefore, to a degree, it may be said that corporate 
crime originated in the market and develops along 
with continuous changes in the market.
Judging from this viewpoint, legislature needs to 
design corporate punishment in accordance with both 
criminal rationales and the condition in which the 
market mechanism of the State has arrived, in order to 
fit criminal punishments to corporate crimes while 
avoiding their negative impacts. In such a market 
where actors can have a fair play, sometimes it might 
be better to be conservative on corporate culpability 
from the standpoints of decreasing societal cost and 
limiting negative effects of criminal sanctions, e.g. 
when amending Law on Certified Public Accountant, 
Japanese legislature chose not to establish criminal 
punishment for auditing legal persons although sup-
port for criminal liability was also considerably strong. 
The main reason is that if given a criminal penalty, a 
legal person’s reputation would be damaged and certi-
fied accountants working for it would resign, thus 
on-going audit would be negatively affected. More-
over, it has been proven by actual examples that 
market mechanism will function in place of criminal 
punishment, for instance, an audit legal person was 
ordered to close temporarily due to offering false cer-
tifying documents in May 2006. Consequently, it lost 
both its reputation and employees. However, it didn’t 
seriously learn from the previous lesson and again 
committed the same mistake after being reorganized in 
the last month of the same year, which resulted in its 
complete closure?. In short, in a comparatively mature 
market economy with an established mechanism of 
selection and elimination through competition, crimi-
nal punishment sometimes isn’t that necessary, 
because the very likely consequence of illegality for a 
legal person is to be forced to close, temporarily or 
permanently, which amounts to sentencing it to death 
and is even much more severe than criminal fine. On 
the contrary, if market mechanism was not so devel-
oped that a mechanism of selection and elimination 
through competition could dominate, it might be nec-
essary for governmental regulation, including criminal 
intervention, to be relatively stronger and wider in 
order to prevent corporate criminality and this is the 
case in China.
Although it was asserted that 30-years of pro-
found reform has brought China to a socialist market 
economy mode in accordance with Chinese reality?, a 
comparatively perfect market mechanism is still 
absent, at least in some crucial fields, e.g. Mr. Fulin 
SHANG, the president of the China Securities Regula-
tory Commission, stated in the preface to Report on 
Development of China Capital Market that China’s 
capital market is still at a premature stage in the com-
parative sense and needs to be perfected in the aspects 
of managing mechanism, legal systems, culture of loy-
alty and supervision?. Practices also imply that strong 
criminal intervention in China is necessary, e.g. 
according to public report, a pharmacy enterprise was 
administratively fined 21 times by industrial and com-
mercial bureaus for making false statements in 
advertising its product in Shanghai around 2006. What 
is surprising, is that the enterprise hasn’t been closed 
and is still there making profit through fraudulent 
statements on the effectiveness of its products?, and 
such a case isn’t rare in China.
Therefore, plural corporate punishments should 
be established according to an overall evaluation of 
market mechanism in future reform and adopt some 
current administrative sanctions as criminal punish-
ments, such as closing permanently or on a fixed-term 
basis, revoking certificates and limiting professional 
activities in the light that administrative authorities 
seem to prefer fine to other choices, e.g. according to 
the 2006 annual report of the SPC, courts at all levels 
tried 1050 cases involving causing a serious accident 
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in construction and causing a serious labor accident in 
2005, and supervisory organizations should obviously 
bear legal responsibility due to their gross negligence. 
Therefore, their level of qualification shall be reduced 
or their certificate of qualification be revoked accord-
ing to article 69 Construction Law of China enacted 
on 1st Nov. 1997. However, such administrative sanc-
tions were scarcely applied, if not ever. Furthermore, 
culpable corporations could find more and concrete 
procedural protections in criminal procedure due to 
requirements of due process.
Ⅲ　Strengthening Victim Compensation
Traditionally, “criminal law is conceived in terms 
of punishment, not of compensation. But this concep-
tion needs to be challenged. Increasingly, victims are 
perceived to have a legitimate role not just in the pro-
cesses of criminal enforcement but also in regard to 
penalty?.” This opinion is gaining more and more 
support in the field of corporate punishment, e.g. the 
“making amends”  mode of restorative justice brought 
forward with by English scholars “ takes place in a 
negotiated process between the offender and victim, 
the offender acknowledges fault and undertakes a task 
of reflecting that acknowledgment. The task and the 
underlying acknowledgement reveal a show of con-
cern for victim?s interest by the offender?.” To stress 
and guarantee victim compensation is not only the call 
of justice, but also that of the ultimate goal of criminal 
law to restore social order by punishing, because vic-
tims might find fewer reasons to respect current social 
order if their interests cannot properly be protected.
According to existing legislation in China, vic-
tims may claim compensation for material loss caused 
by crimes they suffered from through two types of 
procedures, one is collateral civil procedure in crimi-
nal cases and the other is separate civil procedure. 
Unfortunately, neither of the procedures is satisfactory 
due to the desperately low enforcement rate. As for 
collateral civil sentences, it was estimated that 75% of 
victims were unable to receive compensation around 
2006 even in the comparatively developed Guangdong 
province?, and in some regions it might be much 
worse, e.g. authoritative statistics show that no victim 
had been able to gain compensation through collateral 
civil procedure at the Chongwen District Court of Bei-
jing from Jan. 2001 to Oct. 2004?. Enforcement rate 
of civil sentences is much higher. According to statis-
tics disclosed in 2007, it might be estimated around 
54.9%?. However, it still means nearly half of plain-
tiffs cannot obtain actual compensation.
In the case of corporate crime, victim compensa-
tion might be much more difficult and this has been 
proven by publicized cases, the latest one of which is 
the so-called Case of Second Pharmacy Factory of 
Qiqiha’er investigated in 2005, in which 13 patients 
died and more were serious injured due to being 
injected with medicine of inferior quality manufac-
tured by the Second Pharmacy Factory of Qiqiha’er 
located in Heilongjiang province?. Until Apr. 29th, 
2008 when Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court 
ruled that the Second Pharmacy Factory of Qiqiha’er 
was culpable for causing serious accidents according 
to article 135 of Criminal Law and those directly 
responsible were respectively sentenced to imprison-
ments of 4 to 7 years at first instance; no victim had 
been compensated at all?. What is worse is that the 
Food and Medicine Administration of Heilongjiang 
province revoked the license for the pharmaceutical 
producer of Second Pharmacy Factory of Qiqiha’er 
and fined it 19.2 million Yuan on as early as 20th May, 
2005; short after, the criminal investigation procedure 
was initiated. Consequently, the Second Pharmacy 
Factory of Qiqiha’er had been in fact shut down when 
victims filed suit for compensation?. In other words, 
it had become impossible for victims to claim against 
Second Pharmacy Factory of Qiqiha’er for compensa-
tion.
Therefore, it would be quite favorable to victims 
to insert the compensation problem into the criminal 
regime in future reform. On one hand, to claim com-
pensation either through collateral or separate civil 
procedure, victims have to pay for legal counsels and 
other incidental expenses, which may mean extra bur-
den to victims, especially those who are inflicted with 
severe bodily injuries or disease. Moreover, if a victim 
tried to claim compensation through separate civil 
procedure, it would be considerably difficult for him/
her to collect sufficient favorable evidence. To list 
compensation into corporate punishments will release 
victims from such monetary and proof burdens. On the 
other hand, compared to the enforcement rate of civil 
sentences, that of criminal sentences is guaranteed by 
much greater power and this means it’s more likely for 
victims to be actually compensated, not just by pieces 
of papers.
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In addition, practice implies that it would be help-
ful to make it a rule that priority be given to victim 
compensation either in criminal law or criminal proce-
dure law. This principle means that no monetary 
sanction, either administrative or criminal, should be 
imposed on a culpable corporation before victims are 
compensated. 97 Criminal Law provides in article 36 
that, “if criminal who is liable for civil compensation 
is sentenced to a fine at the same time but his property 
is not sufficient to pay both the compensation and the 
fine, or if he is sentenced to confiscation of property at 
the same time, he shall, first of all, bear his liability 
for civil compensation to the victim,” but current leg-
islation exerts no limit on administrative authorities. 
Consequently, when a corporate illegality is disclosed, 
yet the corporation hasn’t been prosecuted or con-
victed, it isn’t safe to say that it is illegal for the 
administrative authority in charge to interfere although 
it is improper, because most administrative laws actu-
ally require administrative organs not to continue to 
intervene as long as the corporate illegality might be a 
criminal one, e.g. article 22 of Anti-unfair competition 
law stipulates that, “a business operator,who resorts to 
bribery by offering money or goods or by any other 
means in selling or purchasing commodities and if the 
case constitutes a crime, shall be investigated for 
criminal responsibility according to law; if the case 
does not constitute a crime, the supervision and 
inspection department may impose a fine??.” How-
ever, due to the absence of direct prohibition, it isn’t 
rare that administrative departments in charge fine a 
corporation before criminal procedure is finished, just 
as the Food and Medicine Administration of Hei-
longjiang province did, thereby the way for victims to 
obtain compensation is actually blocked if the criminal 
corporation were financially incapable to pay adminis-
trative fines and victim compensation at the same 
time, which is often the case in practice. Therefore, 
the rule of giving priority to victim compensation is 
definitely a crucial safeguard for victims to enjoy their 
rights.
6. Conclusion
Corporate punishment has been controversial ever 
since its birth in the 1980s in China. After the 1990s, 
the impact of corporate crime and desire to control 
corporate activities, while overshadowing doubts on 
its justification, paved the way for corporate punish-
ment into criminal laws and scholars have been trying 
to defend it by personifying corporations and re-inter-
preting theory of criminal liability evolved from moral 
responsibility and personal blameworthiness. How-
ever, the current crime situation implies that corporate 
punishment isn’t working as effectively as we 
expected. Although it may be blamed partly on unclear 
ownership, complex relationships between corpora-
tions and administrative organs and weaknesses inside 
up-down supervision, it is not fair to deny deficiencies 
in the existing system of corporate punishment. That’s 
why calls for reform are becoming louder and louder 
and various proposals have been brought forward.
In addition, it would be insufficient for the pur-
pose of preventing corporate crime and stabilizing 
order of the market economy if we just focused on 
corporate punishment and its reform, because corpo-
rate punishments are no more than post-offense 
behaviors and their effectiveness is subject to various 
elements outside the criminal regime. Therefore, while 
reforming corporate punishments, Chinese legislators 
might also need to make an integrated prevention pol-
icy, which might be supported by four pillars, namely, 
inside culture of corporations, outside down-up social 
supervision, administrative sanctions and criminal 
punishments.
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Appendix
Corporate crimes in Criminal Laws in China
SN Article crime
97 Criminal Law
Chapter I?Crimes of Endangering National Security
1. 107 Financing crimes endangering State Security
Chapter II?Crimes of Endangering Public Security
2. 120 Financing terrorist crimes
3. 125 Manufacturing, trading in, transporting, mailing or storing guns, ammunition or explosives
4. 125 Manufacturing, trading in, transporting, mailing or storing dangerous materials
5. 126 Manufacturing or selling guns in violation of regulations
6. 128 Illegally renting or lending guns
7. 135 Causing a serious accident
8. 135 Causing a serious safety accident in large-scale activities of the masses
9. 137 Causing a serious accident in a construction project
10. 138 Causing a serious accident in educational facilities
11. 139 Causing an accident fire prevention
Chapter III?Crimes of Disrupting the Order of Socialist Market
12. 140 Producing or marketing fake or substandard product
13. 141 Producing or marketing fake medicine
14. 142 Producing or marketing medicine of inferior quality
15. 143 Producing or marketing food not up to hygiene standards
16. 144 Producing or marketing poisonous or harmful food
17. 145 Producing or marketing medical apparatus and instruments or medical hygiene materials not up to standards
18. 146 Producing or marketing products not up to safety standards
19. 147 Producing or marketing fake or substandard pesticides, animal pharmaceuticals or chemical fertilizers
20. 148 Producing or marketing cosmetics not up to hygiene standards
21. 151 Smuggling weapons or ammunition
22. 151 Smuggling nuclear material
23. 151 Smuggling counterfeited currency
24. 151 Smuggling cultural relics
25. 151 Smuggling precious metals
26. 151 Smuggling precious and rare species of wildlife or the products
27. 151 Smuggling precious and rare species of plants and the products
28. 152 Smuggling pornographic materials
29. 152 Smuggling wastes
30. 153 Smuggling ordinary items or goods
31. 158 Falsely declaring the capital to be registered
32. 159 Making a false capital contribution or surreptitiously withdrawing contributed capital
33. 160 Issuing shares or bonds by defrauding
34. 161 Illegally Disclosing or concealing critical information
35. 162 Impairing liquidation
36. 162 Concealing or intentionally destroying financial vouchers, financial account books or financial statements
37. 162 False bankruptcy
38. 164 Offering bribe to employee of an unit
39. 174 Establishing a financial institution without the approval
40. 174 Forging, altering or transferring the permit for operation of a financial institution or approval document
41. 175 Making profits through transferring loans
42. 175 Obtaining by fraudulent means loan, acceptance of instrument or financial letter
43. 176 Illegally taking in deposits from the general public
44. 177 Forging or altering financial bills or certificates
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45. 178 Forging or altering treasury certificates or negotiable securities
46. 178 Forging or altering stocks or corporate or enterprise bonds
47. 179 Issuing stocks or corporate or enterprise bonds without competent approval
48. 180 Buying or selling by side information or divulging inside information
49. 181 Fabricating and spreading false information about stock or future exchange transaction
50. 181 Cajoling investors into buying or selling securities or futures contracts
51. 182 Rigging stock or futures prices
52. 185 Misusing trusted property
53. 185 Misappropriating money belonging to an unit or any client
54. 186 Illegally granting loans
55. 187 Illegally lending funds instead of entering them into the account book
56. 188 Issuing in violation of regulations financial bills or certificates
57. 189 Accepting, paying or guaranteeing unlawful negotiable instruments
58. 190 Depositing foreign exchange outside China or illegally transferring foreign exchange
59. 191 Money laundering
60. 192 Unlawfully raising funds by means of fraud
61. 194 Fraud by negotiable instruments
62. 194 Fraud by means of financial bills
63. 195 Fraud by means of letter of credit
64. 198 Insurance fraud
65. 201 Evading taxes
66. 203 Dodging unpaid part of due tax
67. 204 Obtaining a tax refund for exports by false declaration for exports
68. 205 Falsely making out special invoices for value-added tax or any other invoices to defraud a tax refund for 
exports or to offset tax money
69. 206 Forging or selling forged special invoices for value- added tax
70. 207 Illegally selling special invoices for value- added tax
71. 208 Illegally buying real or forged special invoices for value- added tax or
72. 209 Illegally making or selling invoices to defraud a tax refund for exports or to offset tax money
73. 209 Illegally making or selling unlawfully made invoices
74. 209 Illegally selling invoices to defraud a tax refund for exports or to offset tax money
75. 209 Illegally selling invoices
76. 213 Counterfeiting registered trademark
77. 214 Selling commodities bearing counterfeit registered trademarks
78. 215 Illegally manufacturing or selling illegally manufactured representations of registered trademark
79. 216 Counterfeiting a patent
80. 217 Infringing on copyright
81. 218 Selling works reproduced by infringing on other’s copyright
82. 219 Commercial espionage
83. 221 Maliciously damaging another person’s business credit or commodity reputation
84. 222 False publicity
85. 223 Collusion in Bidding
86. 224 Fraud by means of contract
87. 225 Illegal conducting business
88. 226 Trading by force
89. 227 Counterfeiting or scalping counterfeit negotiable ticket
90. 227 Scalping train or ship tickets,
91. 228 Illegally transferring or scalping land-use right
92. 229 Providing false testifying paper
93. 229 Producing testifying papers highly inconsistent with the facts
94. 230 Evading commodity inspection
Chapter IV?Crimes of Infringing on Rights of the Persons and Democratic Rights
95. 244 Forcing employees to work
96. 244 Employing minors to do dangerous job or job with heavily physical labor
97. 250 Publishing works discriminating or insulting minority nations
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Chapter V?Crimes of Property Violation
98. 273 Misappropriation of funds or materials allocated for special purposes
Chapter VI?Crimes of Obstructing Administration of Public Order
99. 281 Illegally manufacturing or selling or buying police insignia or police implements
100. 288 Disrupting order of radio communication management
101. 319 Obtaining exit certificates by fraud
102. 325 Illegally selling or presenting cultural relic as a gift to a foreigner without competent authorization
103. 326 Illegally reselling cultural relics
104. 327 Illegally selling or presenting as gifts without permission cultural relic in collection
105. 330 Impairing prevention of infectious disease
106. 332 Impairing health quarantine at national frontier or boundary
107. 334 Unlawfully collecting or supplying blood or making or supplying blood products
108. 337 Evading animal and plant quarantine
109. 338 Causing a major environmental pollution accident
110. 339 Illegally disposing of imported solid waste
111. 339 Importing solid waste without competent approval
112. 340 Illegally catching aquatic products
113. 341 Illegally catching or killing precious and endangered species of wildlife
114. 341 Illegally purchasing, transporting or selling species of wildlife or the products
115. 341 Illegally hunting
116. 342 Illegally occupying cultivated land
117. 343 Illegally mining
118. 343 Mining in devastative way
119. 344 Illegally felling or destroying plants protected by the State
120. 344 Illegally purchasing, transporting, processing or selling plants protected by the State or the products
121. 345 Stealthily felling forest trees
122. 345 Arbitrarily felling forest trees
123. 345 Illegally purchasing or transporting forest tress stealthily or arbitrarily felled
124. 347 Smuggling, trading, transporting or manufacturing narcotic drug
125. 350 Smuggling materials used in manufacture of narcotic drug
126. 350 Illegally selling or buying materials used in manufacture of narcotic drug
127. 355 Illegally providing narcotic or psychotropic substances
128. 363 Producing, duplicating, publishing, selling or disseminating pornographic materials for profit
129. 363 Providing book numbers for another person to publish pornographic books or periodicals
130. 364 Disseminating pornographic materials
131. 364 Arranging for shows of pornographic audio-video products
132. 365 Arranging for pornographic performances
Chapter VII?Crimes of Impairing the Interests of National Defense
133. 370 Intentionally providing substandard weapons or equipment or military installations
134. 375 Illegally producing or selling or buying military installations
135. 380 Intentionally refusing to accept orders for military supplies or delaying the provision of such supplies during wartime
Chapter VIII?Crimes of Embezzlement and Bribery
136. 387 Accepting bribe of an unit
137. 391 Offering an unit bribe
138. 393 Offering bribe of an unit
139. 396 Illegally dividing up State-owned assets
140. 396 Illegally dividing fine or confiscated money or property
Chapter IX?Crimes of Dereliction of Duty
141. 403 Abusing competence to regulate corporate or stock exchange
Special Criminal Law Enacted on Dec.12, 1998
142. Purchasing foreign exchange by fraud
